YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS

a handbook for trade union members and organizers

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

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CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS — PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLET

WHAT'S IN THIS HANDBOOK

F. THE LAWS WHICH PROTECT YOU

FOREWORD

I commend this pamphlet to you because it deals with civil rights in an intensely practical way. It tells union organizers and union members how to protect their civil rights in order to make them the valuable possessions they were intended to be.

I believe that we have grown smug about civil rights in our country. Too few of us are willing every day and under all circumstances to embrace the premises of our democracy. We are too ready to say "I believe in picketing, but—" or "Sure, every man has the right to speak as he pleases and vote as he pleases, but—". I am exceedingly concerned that the "but" has grown so large as to devour the right which it purports to qualify.

This pamphlet comes at a particularly appropriate hour in our history. We are today in the midst of an intensifying attack upon popular liberty.

The recent strike movement in this country has made labor sharply aware that the struggle for human rights and for popular liberty is a never-ending struggle. In the course of the wave of injunctions to which the strike movement gave rise, labor witnessed blunt intolerance of the civil rights of workers. We saw judges using their office to give vent to their bias against workers. We saw what all of us had believed to be irreducible guarantees of human liberty disregarded through injunctions fully as repressive as the injunctions of an earlier day. We witnessed a revival of shocking forms of police brutality against workers in the exercise of their constitutional rights.

The fact is that liberty is indivisible. When one group in a community suffers a loss of rights or is a victim of police brutality, a pattern is created which soon destroys the freedom of all groups who depend upon civil rights for their continuing existence.

Recent history has made it clear that no man's freedom is safe as long as the freedom of another is threatened. Those groups in the community concerned with the survival of democracy cannot remain indifferent when labor's rights are attacked. Nor may labor organizations confine their concern to the protection of labor's rights alone and disregard the invasion of the civil rights of others.

There is a strong need today for a great crusade to make civil liberties a reality among our people. Those rights, which after all are the essence of our political system, must be brought to the people for whose use they were intended. They must be wrested from the law books and from the discussions of the learned societies and fused into the every day conduct of every day people. As responsible citizens of a democracy we must see to it that the people know their rights, but we must do more than that. We must identify and fight as the enemies of America those bigots who seek to suppress the liberties of the people.

PHILIP MURRAY, President
Congress of Industrial Organizations

October, 1946

This pamphlet has been designed as a tool. It should be used by trade union members and organizers as a means of lightening their task. A right or a liberty does not do anybody any good if it is written in a law book but ignored by law enforcement officials.

The purpose of this pamphlet is to prevent violations of your rights before they occur by enabling you to bring to the attention of the proper officials the fact that you, as a trade union member or organizer, have certain basic rights which cannot be interfered with.

If a local law enforcement official attempts to interfere with the distribution of union literature or solicitation of union members you should bring his attention to the fact that these activities are protected by the Constitution and by federal law. If he tries to interfere with you on the basis of a local ordinance regulating such activities as leaflet distribution or canvassing, you should read to him the quotations in this pamphlet dealing with such ordinances.

Bear in mind that the local law enforcement officer has two responsibilities. The officer himself must respect your civil rights as an officer of the law. But his responsibility goes further than that. If private individuals interfere with or restrain your exercise of civil rights—the law enforcement officer has a duty to protect you. His official responsibility requires him to check any attempts to interfere with the exercise of your civil rights.

In other words, law enforcement officials may not by their own action interfere with your civil rights or by their inaction wilfully permit others to interfere with your civil rights.

If the officer persists in violating your rights you should demand to talk to the city attorney or the higher officials of the city or town.

In the event that local authorities, including the mayor, the city attorney and the sheriff, refuse to protect your rights, you should take prompt steps to see to it that your rights are protected.

Getting Federal Protection

You should then get in touch with the federal district attorney for the district in which the violation of constitutional rights has occurred. (*A list of the district attorneys for the entire nation is printed at the back of this pamphlet.*) It would be desirable for you to familiarize yourself with his name. If you live in or near a city where his office is located, do not hesitate to drop in to see him and discuss your problems with him. It is just as much his job to prevent violations of the law as to punish them after they occur. Frequently a well placed word from the federal district attorney will accomplish wonders in securing compliance on the part of local officials with the federal Constitution and federal statutes.

If consultation with local authorities and with the federal district attorney still fails to solve your problem, you should get in touch with the Department of Justice in Washington. The Department of Justice is the Department which has as its job the protection of the constitutional rights of all the people.

Within the Department of Justice there is a section known as the Civil Rights Section. It is the specific responsibility of this Section to protect the constitutional rights of the people.

The chief of the Civil Rights Section is Turner L. Smith. Serving under Mr. Smith is Fred Folsom, who is in charge of the Civil Rights Unit of the Department of Justice. You should not hesitate to communicate with either of these government officials in order to get protection for the exercise of your civil rights.

A letter sent to Mr. Smith or Mr. Folsom should be precise and to the point. It should be in the form of a specific charge that rights have been invaded and it should indicate the precise way in which those rights have been invaded. Wherever possible your letter should be supported by affidavits.

If You Need Help

If you need assistance either in connection with contacting the local district attorney or with sending your charges to

Washington, you should get in touch with the CIO Legal Department, 718 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D. C., or with your own union.

Remember that the important thing is to get officials of state or local governments to recognize your rights.

You want to get your rights recognized for a particular concrete purpose—namely, to organize workers. Your job is to keep clear the channels of communication to the workers so that you can be free to call them together in meetings, to address them when they have met, to distribute leaflets and handbills to them.

When local officials, either acting on their own discretion or on the basis of ordinances, try to prevent you from doing this job, then you have the task—either by your own presentation on the basis of the material in this pamphlet, or through the influence of others—of getting local officials to permit you to exercise your rights peacefully and in accordance with the best traditions of American citizens.

The Bill of Rights

The Bill of Rights consists of ten amendments to our Constitution. The most important is the First Amendment. It says:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Two things should be noted about this provision of the Bill of Rights.

In the first place, it outlaws restrictions on freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of the right to assemble peaceably and to petition the Government for correction of grievances. *These are the most basic rights of a citizen in a democracy.*

These rights are indispensable to the formation and functioning of a labor organization. These rights include: the right to distribute union literature, the right to solicit union memberships on public thoroughfares, the right to canvass from door to door in the interests of a union organizing campaign, and the right to picket.

In the second place, it should be pointed out that this provision of the Bill of Rights only prohibits *Congress* from invading these rights. In other words, if the federal government passes a law prohibiting distribution of leaflets or interfering with the right to assemble, this provision of the Bill of Rights makes it unconstitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment

But if a *state* or a *municipality* passes a law interfering with these rights, we must look elsewhere in the Constitution than the First Amendment in order to establish its illegality. The

place to look is the Fourteenth Amendment. This amendment states, in Section 1:

> "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

It is well established that all the rights which are protected by the Bill of Rights from infringement by *Congress* are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected from invasion by the various *states*. Thus, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the various states of the Union are prohibited from doing those things which Congress is prohibited from doing by virtue of the First Amendment. But the law goes farther than that. It is also well established that municipal ordinances, by-laws and local regulations are also prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment when they invade fundamental rights and liberties.

As a matter of fact, most of the violations of the Constitution that labor organizations encounter are found in local and municipal ordinances. This does not mean that state legislators do not also occasionally violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It simply means that local governments are more prone to pass prejudiced laws which run afoul of the basic guarantees of the Constitution.

What Does the Law Say?

Let us look again at the language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which we have quoted above. It says that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. This means that *any person,*

whether he is a citizen or not, is guaranteed the basic liberties of speech, press, religion and assembly. In addition to that, the amendment states that no state shall "make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of *citizens* of the United States". That means that, in addition to the protection afforded to all persons, citizens have a further protection.

In a famous Supreme Court case, instituted by the CIO, the Supreme Court held that it was a privilege of a citizen of the United States—and one secured by the Constitution—to "assemble and to discuss (labor matters) and to communicate respecting them whether orally or in writing." *Hague v. CIO,* 307 U. S. 496. The specific question in that case was whether the municipality could require a permit for the use of streets or parks for public assembly; and whether it could authorize the police director to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that a refusal would prevent a riot or other disturbance.

Acting under this law, the city refused a permit for a meeting which was called by the CIO for the purpose of explaining to workers the National Labor Relations Act, the benefits to be derived from it and the aid that the CIO would give workers in obtaining those benefits. The Supreme Court held that the right to discuss with workers these matters was a privilege of a citizen of the United States which could not be abridged by a state. It stated:

"The National Labor Relations Act declares the policy of the United States to be to remove obstructions to commerce by encouraging collective bargaining, protecting full freedom of association and self-organization of workers, and, through their representatives, negotiating as to conditions of employment.

"Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom. All of the respondents' proscribed activities have had this single end and aim."

The National Labor Relations Act

Under the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) workers are guaranteed the right to organize and bargain collectively.

This act has been upheld by the Supreme Court and is part of the laws of our nation. The right to organize is a federally-guaranteed right.

This means that the distribution of leaflets in order to organize unions, the solicitation of union memberships, either by the spoken or written word, the canvassing of workers' homes in order to convey to them the message of unionism, the calling and holding of union meetings—all of these activities are not

only protected by the Constitution but expressly protected against interference by Federal statute.

The National Labor Relations Act expressly provides:

> "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."

The rights which are protected by the National Labor Relations Act are spelled out by Section 7 of that Act as follows:

> "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."

If a *state* or a *municipality* interferes with the right to form a union through leaflet distribution or to engage in union activities, its action is unconstitutional. If an *employer* interferes with the exercise of these rights by his employee, he is violating the National Labor Relations Act. If a *police official* or a *sheriff* interferes with the exercise of these rights, he is liable for prosecution in the Federal courts.

The Criminal Code expressly provides:

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States * * * shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one year or both." Criminal Code, Section 20 (18 U.S.C.A., Sec. 52)

A sheriff or a police officer who interferes with workers organizing a union or with union representatives assisting workers to organize a union by distributing leaflets or holding meetings, may be prosecuted under this statute and subjected to fine and imprisonment. That is so because the right to organize is a right protected by the Constitution and by the laws of the United States, specifically the National Labor Relations Act.

Not only may the sheriff or the police officer involved be *fined* and *imprisoned* for depriving an individual of his constitutional and federal rights; but the law also expressly provides that he is liable in *damages* to the party injured as a result of his invasion of the individual's rights. R. S. Sec. 1979 (8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 43).

Fighting Mob Violence

Suppose members of the public form a mob which interferes with the right to organize, or which threatens to injure union members. Any such mob action is a criminal offense under the laws of the United States. These laws provide:

"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same * * * they shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 and imprisoned not more than ten years * * * " Criminal Code, Sec. 19 (18 U.S.C.A., Sec. 51).

Let us repeat, the law of the land permits neither the local government nor its officials nor employers nor private mobs to interfere with the right to organize, to distribute leaflets, to solicit union membership, to canvass workers' homes from door to door, and to call and hold union meetings.

It is particularly important to bear in mind that sheriffs or police officers who attempt to prevent the distribution of handbills on public thoroughfares are themselves violating civil rights guaranteed by federal law and by the Constitution. While company police are not officers of the law they have no right to discourage or interfere with union organization. If any part of their pay comes from public funds then they are subject to all the restrictions applicable to regular police.

Our Highest Tribunal

The Supreme Court is the highest court in our land. When we try to find out what the Constitution stands for or what our Federal laws mean we look to the decisions of the Supreme Court for the last word.

With respect to all of the activities which are important in organizing workers—the distribution of leaflets and literature, the calling and holding of meetings, speaking in public places, canvassing from door to door, picketing—the Supreme Court has handed down important decisions which constitute the law of our land. It is the duty of every public official of every state and municipality, of all police officers and sheriffs, to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court.

Decision of 1939

One of the most important decisions handed down by the Supreme Court was in the case of *Lovell* v. *City of Griffin, Georgia,* 303 U. S. 444.

In that case an individual was convicted of violating a city ordinance of the City of Griffin, Georgia. The ordinance in question provided:

"Section 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin.

"Section 2. The Chief of Police of the City of Griffin and the police force of the City of Griffin are hereby required and directed to sup-

press the same and to abate any nuisance as is described in the first section of this ordinance."

The individual involved in this case did not apply for a permit as required by the ordinance. She was fined. She claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it interfered with freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed with her. The Court said:

"We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. * * * Legislation of the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.

"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets."

This case means that any city ordinance which prohibits distribution of literature or circulars—such as union leaflets, pamphlets or papers — without permission from the city authorities is unconstitutional because it abridges freedom of the press.

Unconstitutional Ordinances

In *Schneider* v. *State of New Jersey,* 308 U. S. 147, the Supreme Court struck down four ordinances relating to the distribution of literature, such as handbills and leaflets, because they abridged liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circularize information or opinion.

The first ordinance involved was one adopted by the City of Los Angeles which provided:

"No person shall distribute any hand-bill to or among pedestrians along or upon any street, sidewalk or park, or to passengers on any street car, or throw, place or attach any hand-bill in, to or upon any automobile or other vehicle.

" 'Hand-bill' shall mean any hand-bill, dodger, commercial advertising circular, folder, booklet, letter, card, pamphlet, sheet, poster, sticker, banner, notice or other written, printed or painted matter calculated to attract attention of the public."

An individual distributed handbills to pedestrians on a public sidewalk advertising a political meeting to which admission was to be charged. The city government tried to justify the ordinance on the ground that it was designed to prevent littering of the streets and that, besides, the handbills contemplated a commercial transaction. The Supreme Court brushed aside both of these defenses and held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional invasion of the freedoms of speech and press.

The second ordinance of this type which the Court struck down was an ordinance of the City of Milwaukee which provided:

"It is hereby made unlawful for any person * * * to * * * throw * * * paper * * * or to circulate or distribute any circular, hand-bills, cards, posters, dodgers, or other printed or advertising matter * * * in or upon any sidewalk, street, alley, wharf, boat landing, dock or other public place, park or ground within the City of Milwaukee."

In this case a person acting as a picket and distributing handbills about a labor dispute to passing pedestrians, the leaflet also asked the public to refrain from patronizing a particular establishment. Some of the handbills were thrown on the street by the persons to whom they were given, with the result that many of the papers lay in the gutter and on the street.

The person who passed out the handbills was arrested for violating the ordinance. Here, too, the city sought to justify the ordinance on the ground that its purpose was to prevent unsightly and untidy sidewalks. The Supreme Court rejected this defense and struck down the ordinance.

The third ordinance involved was one adopted by the City of Worcester, Massachusetts, which provided:

"No person shall distribute in, or place upon any street or way, any placard, handbill, flyer, poster, advertisement or paper of any description."

An individual was arrested and convicted under this ordinance. This conviction was set aside by the Supreme Court and the ordinance condemned as unconstitutional. In dealing with the justification for the three ordinances, namely, that they were necessary to prevent littering of the streets, the Supreme Court stated in unmistakable language that such a purpose could not be used to interfere with freedom of speech or freedom of the press. The Court said:

"We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it."

"Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press. This constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.

"It is argued that the circumstances that in the actual enforcement of the Milwaukee ordinance the distributor is arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it in the streets, renders it valid. But, even as thus construed, the ordinance cannot be enforced

without unconstitutionally abridging the liberty of free speech. As we have pointed out, the public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution."

In other words, the Court said that you cannot prevent the littering of the streets by prohibiting the distribution of leaflets. If a city wants to prevent street littering, it should punish those who actually litter the streets.

In connection with two of the ordinances, still another attempt was made to save them.

It was argued that these ordinances were not unconstitutional because, while they prohibited leaflet distribution upon the streets or sidewalks, they did not prohibit all forms of leaflet distribution. The Supreme Court had this to say about that argument:

"It is suggested that the Los Angeles and Worcester ordinances are valid because their operation is limited to streets and alleys and leaves persons free to distribute printed matter in other public places. But, as we have said, the streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."

Licenses for Leaflets

Sometimes a town or city passes an ordinance requiring a license for the distribution of commercial handbills or forbidding their distribution altogether.

When a trade union issues a handbill or a membership appeal which calls for the payment of dues, these cities or

municipalities try to punish the union organizer for violating this commercial ordinance. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that trade union activity such as organizing or calling a meeting is not a commercial activity, even if it calls for the payment of dues or initiation fees.

In the case of *Jamison* v. *State of Texas,* 318 U. S. 413, the Supreme Court held that a state or municipality could not interfere with the exercise of a constitutional right, such as free speech, because money is incidentally solicited. The Supreme Court in that case again repeated its rule that,

> "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word."

In *Hague* v. *CIO,* 307 U. S. 496, the City of Jersey City passed an ordinance forbidding public parades or public meetings on or upon the public streets, sidewalks, public parks or public buildings, unless a permit was obtained from the chief of police.

Under the terms of the ordinance the chief of police was authorized to grant permits on application. He was also given complete discretion to refuse the issuance of a permit if he felt that such a refusal would prevent a riot or other disturbance.

The Supreme Court ruled, however, that it is a privilege of a citizen of the United States within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to use the streets and parks for communicating his views on national questions. It held that the ordinance was void because it permitted the police chief to refuse a permit on his say-so that a riot or a disturbance would result.

The Streets Belong To You

The police have a duty to maintain order in connection with a public meeting, the Court said in the *Hague* case, and an ordinance which authorizes the police to refuse a permit for such a meeting because of fear of disorder is unconstitutional and void. The following language from the case is important and should be brought to the attention of local officials wherever necessary:



"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance void upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."

The Supreme Court case of *Schneider* v. *State of New Jersey,* 308 U. S. 147, which has already been discussed, involved three ordinances dealing with leaflet distribution. There was a fourth ordinance involved in this case which was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. This ordinance, passed by the City of Irvington, New Jersey, required persons intending to canvass, solicit, distribute circulars or call from house to house, to receive a written permit from the chief of police.

An individual who was circulating literature for which she received small financial contributions of a religious society was arrested and sentenced under the ordinance.

The city justified this ordinance on the ground that it had a right to regulate fraudulent solicitation. The Supreme Court struck down this ordinance. It said that the effect of this ordinance was to impose a prior censorship upon any one who wished to present his views on political, social or economic questions to citizens at their homes.

In holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated:

"It bans unlicensed communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house and who may distribute it. The applicant must submit to that officer's judgment evidence as to his good character and as to the absence of fraud in the 'project' he proposes to promote or the literature he intends to distribute, and must undergo a burdensome and inquisitorial examination, including photographing and fingerprinting. In the end, his liberty to communicate with the residents of the town at their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer's discretion.

" * * * pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees."

Tossing Out The Baby With The Bath

In answering the argument of the city, namely, that it had a right to prevent fraudulent appeals, the Supreme Court said:

"a municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while others may not, disseminate information from house to house."

The Supreme Court pointed out that if the city wanted to punish fraud, it could do so when the fraud actually occurred. If it wanted to punish trespassers into people's homes, that likewise could be forbidden by law.

But one thing a city cannot do is to abridge freedom of speech and freedom of the press under the guise of preventing fraud and trespassing.

In *Martin* v. *City of Struthers, Ohio,* 319 U. S. 141, the subject of canvassing came before the Supreme Court with a new wrinkle. The City of Struthers, Ohio, passed a law which made it a crime to summon a resident of a house to the door for the purpose of receiving a handbill. The law reads as follows:



"It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing."

You will notice that the law does not prohibit leaving a circular or other literature at the door; it simply prohibits calling the occupant of the home to the door by a door bell, knocker or otherwise.

The Supreme Court said that this city ordinance was a violation of the constitutional right to free speech. It felt that the right to free speech was more important than the right of the individual home-owner to privacy. The heart of the Supreme Court's decision in the case is in these paragraphs:

"While door to door distributors of literature may be either a nuisance or a blind for criminal activities, they may also be useful members of society engaged in the dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free discussion. The widespread use of this method of communication by many groups espousing various causes attests its major importance. * * *

"Many of our most widely established religious organizations have used this method of disseminating their doctrines, and laboring groups have used it in recruiting their mem-

bers. The federal government, in its current war bond selling campaign, encourages groups of citizens to distribute advertisements and circulars from house to house. Of course, as every person acquainted with political life knows, door to door campaigning is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support, while the circulation of nominating papers would be greatly handicapped if they could not be taken to the citizens in their homes. Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.

"Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas."

You should notice that the Supreme Court expressly refers to the fact that labor organizations use the method of soliciting from door to door as a means of recruiting members.

One of the most important of the decisions of the Supreme Court is the decision in *Thomas* v. *Collins,* 323 U. S. 516. In this case the Supreme Court considered a Texas statute which required every labor union organizer operating in Texas to register with the Secretary of State.

R. J. Thomas, a union leader, spoke to a trade union meeting in Texas on behalf of labor organizations. Since he had not registered the state put him in jail for violating the law.

The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of free speech and freedom of assembly to require an individual to register with the state before talking to a trade union group or on behalf of trade unionism. The Supreme Court pointed out that trade union meetings and meetings to organize trade unions were lawful assemblies protected by the Constitution, and that to call such meetings or to speak before such meetings cannot be made a crime.

The Supreme Court went on to say that not only could it not be made a crime to participate in such meetings, but it cannot be made a requirement to register as a condition to holding such meetings. The Supreme Court said:

"If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction.

"If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment."

Wagner Act Protects Your Rights

All individuals are protected against interference by states or municipalities in the exercise of their rights to free speech, free assembly and free press. In the same way, employees are protected from interference by their employers in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.

Under that Act, employees have a right to organize and to form unions. In the case of *National Labor Relations Board* v. *LeTourneau Co. of Georgia,* 324 U. S. 793, the company adopted a rule prohibiting distribution of handbills of any description on company property without first securing permission from the personnel department.

The company's plant was located right next to the highway; between the highway and the plant there was a large company-owned parking area. Certain employees violated the company's

rule by distributing union literature in the parking area. The Labor Board and the Supreme Court held that an employer who discharges an employee for distributing union literature is in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.

In *Republic Aviation Corporation* v. *National Labor Relations Board,* 324 U. S. 793, a similar company rule was issued. This time the company laid down a general rule prohibiting any type of soliciting on plant property. In violation of the rule, an employee passed out application cards on his own time and he was fired. Here too the Labor Board held that the discharge was a violation of the Wagner Act.

In both cases the Supreme Court upheld the Labor Board. It ruled that these plant rules violated the National Labor Relations Act in so far as they apply to union literature and that employees are protected against discharge for violating either of these rules. In both cases the discharged employees were reinstated with back pay.

The reasoning of the Supreme Court in both of these cases closely resembled its reasoning in other civil rights cases which involved handbills and canvassing. It argued that just as a law cannot prevent the distribution of handbills in order to eliminate littering the streets, so an employer cannot prevent the distribution of union literature by his employees in order to control littering his property. The rights of private property, the Court concluded, must yield when they come into conflict with the rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.

States Can't Interfere

If a state law conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act, even if it is not an interference with free speech, it cannot stand.

This very issue came before the Court in a case called *Hill* v. *State of Florida,* 325 U. S. 538. In that case, the Supreme Court had under consideration a Florida statute which set up certain qualifications for union business agents. For example, it required that he could not carry on his work unless he first

obtained a license. Such a permit would be issued only to persons who could prove they had been citizens of the United States for more than 10 years. An agency of the state was authorized to pass upon all applications for licenses, with the right to deny any, if it so chose.

The Supreme Court held in the *Hill* case that the Wagner Act provided to workers a full freedom of choice in the selection of bargaining representatives and complete freedom to engage in collective bargaining. The Court therefore concluded that no state statute can establish conditions which must first be observed before the rights guaranteed by the federal law can be enjoyed.

In the following unmistakable language the Supreme Court indicated that it will not tolerate interference by state laws with the freedom to organize and bargain collectively:

"It is apparent that the Florida statute has been so construed and applied that the union and its selected representative are prohibited from functioning as collective bargaining agents, or in any other capacity, except upon conditions fixed by Florida.

"The declared purpose of the Wagner Act, as shown in its first section, is to encourage collective bargaining, and to protect the 'full freedom' of workers in the selection of bargaining representatives of their own choice. To this end Congress made it illegal for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in selecting their representatives.

"Congress attached no conditions whatsoever to their freedom of choice in this respect. Their own best judgment, not that of someone else, was to be their guide. 'Full freedom' to choose an agent means freedom to pass upon that agent's qualifications.

"Section 4 of the Florida act circumscribed the 'full freedom' of choice which Congress said employees should possess. It does this by re-

quiring a 'business agent' to prove to the satisfaction of a Florida Board that he measures up to standards set by the State of Florida as one who, among other things, performs the exact function of a collective bargaining representative. To the extent that Section 4 limits a union's choice of such an 'agent' or bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida's judgment for the workers' judgment.

"Thus, the 'full freedom' of employees in collective bargaining which Congress envisioned as essential to protect the free flow of commerce among the states would be, by the Florida statute, shrunk to a greatly limited freedom."

Bear in mind this fact: Just as a *state* may not restrict the right of freedom of speech and assembly by requiring organizers to register before speaking on behalf of trade unions, so a *town* or a *municipality* cannot interfere with trade union organization.

Organizers Don't Need Licenses

If a local law enforcement officer attempts to interfere with your right to organize workers on the basis of an ordinance requiring labor organizers or business agents to register, it should be called to his attention that such regulations of trade union organizers or busines agents have been declared unconstitutional in the *Thomas* case and in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act in the *Hill* case.

Recently the City of Redding, California, passed an ordinance to prevent any person within the city limits from soliciting membership in any organization which requires the payment of dues, unless he had first procured a license to do so. The fee for a license was set at $5.

The California Court held that this ordinance was an unconstitutional interference with free speech and free assembly.

The Court also held that the imposition of a license payment upon the exercise of the privilege of soliciting union membership interferes with the right to organize trade unions.

In discussing the conflict between the ordinance and the right to organize, the California Court said:

> "A part of the right of self-organization of employees is the right of reasonable solicitation of others to join their union * * * The solicitation of members is one of the most important activities of a union. Such solicitation is to a union akin to what breathing is to a human being. It is axiomatic to say that without members a union cannot function." *In re Porterfield*, 28 A.C. No. 3 (California) 102, 127.

The Court held that a license requirement for membership solicitation is both an interference with free speech and free assembly, and also in conflict with the right to organize trade unions.

In the *LeTourneau* and the *Republic Aviation* cases the Supreme Court said that an *employer* could not control his property in such a way as to prevent his *employees* from exercising their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Does an *ordinary individual* have the right to exercise his constitutional rights, such as distributing leaflets, soliciting union memberships and picketing, on private property?

Of course an individual cannot enter a private plant and exercise his constitutional rights there. But what about a company town? The Supreme Court gave the answer in *Marsh* v. *State of Alabama*, 326 U. S. 501.

In that case an individual was distributing literature on the premises of a company-owned town. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, was completely owned by a ship-building company. Most of the residents in the town used a company-

owned paved street and sidewalk in transacting business. The town and its shopping district were accessible to and freely used by the public in general.

The company posted notices throughout the town stating that it was private property and that there could be no solicitation of any kind without written permission. The state court upheld the conviction of an individual for trespassing on company property on the ground that the company owned the property and had the right to exercise control over it.

But the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It ruled that an individual's constitutional liberties cannot be curtailed merely because the company owns the property on which his liberties were being exercised, since the property was frequently used by the public for other purposes.

The Supreme Court said:

> "Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. * * *
>
> "Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.
>
> "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."

Under this decision an individual cannot be punished for distributing union literature or soliciting union memberships or picketing in a company town.

We believe, moreover, that this decision carries us even further. By the same token, an individual who distributes literature in a private industrial terminal or a port area cannot be punished on the ground that he is trespassing on private property—provided only that the area in which he is distributing literature has been made freely accessible to the public.

When a company guard or a corporation private policeman attempts to interfere with the distribution of literature because you are on private property in an area which is freely accessible to other members of the public, you should take the same steps to protect your civil rights that you would take if a public officer violated them.

Picketing Is Free Speech

For many years it was common practice for states and municipalities to pass laws against picketing. But now it is clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court that picketing is a form of free speech protected by the Constitution.

One of the early indications that the Supreme Court regarded picketing as a form of free speech appeared in an opinion of the Supreme Court in *Senn* v. *Tile Layers Protective Union,* 301 U. S. 468. In that decision the Court announced:



> "Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."

In a series of other cases, the Supreme Court has struck down attempts by the states to limit or restrict picketing.

One of the most important of these is *Thornhill* v. *State of Alabama,* 310 U. S. 88, involving an Alabama statute which made picketing a misdemeanor. A worker, Byron Thornhill, was convicted of picketing. The picketing actually took place not on a public road but on company property at a private entrance for employees.

In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court used this striking language with respect to freedom of speech and freedom of the press:

> "The freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state.
>
> "The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be ex-

posed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government. Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government."

The Court Says Yes

The Court then dealt with the important question whether picketing constitutes free speech. Referring to the earlier cases which have already been mentioned in the pamphlet, such as the *Hague* case, the *Schneider* case and the *Senn* case, it held that picketing is a form of free speech which is protected by the Constitution.

It stated:



"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."

* * * *

"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within the area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. * * *

"It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned. The health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these matters, and the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing.

"The merest glance at State and Federal legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem.

"We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Senn's case * * * : 'Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'"

This is a clear and unclouded expression by the Supreme Court that picketing is a form of communication of ideas which is protected by the Bill of Rights. The Court rejected

the state's defense that the statute was drawn to prevent violence by a prohibition on picketing.

On the same day on which the Supreme Court decided in the *Thornhill* case that picketing in a labor dispute was free speech, it decided another case called *Carlson* v. *State of California,* 310 U. S. 106. This case concerned a California county's anti-picketing law which prohibited the carrying of banners or signs in front of a factory or place of business during a labor dispute.

The Court struck down this law as an unconstitutional violation of free speech. It reaffirmed the fact that free speech



includes picketing and that those who engage in labor disputes are protected by the Constitution.

The Court said, in disposing of the case:

> "For the reasons set forth in our opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, * * * publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a state."

The Supreme Court had already decided that picketing is a form of free speech which is protected by the Constitution. But later another issue arose: does protection of this type of free speech include the case of a picket who is not an employee of the picketed employer? In other words, in a situation in which there is no immediate dispute between an employer and his employees, can other individuals picket him without interference by a state if they think he is unfair? The Supreme Court said: "Yes".

A law or a court injunction is unconstitutional if it attempts to prohibit picketing in any dispute between an employer and a union on the basis that the employer's own employees are not engaged in the controversy. The Court ruled:

> "Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech." *A. F. of L.* v. *Swing,* 312 U. S. 321.

The Court explained that labor organizations have a legitimate interest in trying to unionize an entire industry. Union employees have a right to picket a non-union employer who

has lower wage standards in order to promote unionism and to protect their own union standards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court decided:

"A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.

"The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. * * * The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's case."

A Few Limitations

Of course, the right to free speech or free assembly is not absolute or unlimited.

The Supreme Court has pointed out that the privilege of using the streets for the distribution of handbills may be regulated. But the point to remember is that this activity cannot be regulated in such a way as to interfere seriously with your right to communicate with other people.

Likewise, if you engage in picketing which is violent, the right to picket may be regulated. Here also it is important to bear in mind that a court cannot forbid the picketing just because it fears there may be violence or because isolated acts of past violence have occurred. If there is a very real danger

that violence will occur and that the local police cannot control the situation, then picketing may be regulated.

However, the fact that harsh language may be used on the picket line does not give a court a basis for interfering with the workers' right to picket. In a recent case, *Cafeteria Employees Union* v. *Angelo,* 320 U. S. 293, harsh language was used on the picket line. The Court held that the mere use of harsh language, and even isolated instances of violence, provides no reason to issue an injunction against picketing. The right of free speech, the Court said, cannot be forfeited because of minor sporadic violence, and

> "Still less can the right to picket itself be taken away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that picketing."

Another case which makes the same point is *Milk Wagon Drivers* v. *Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,* 312 U. S. 287:

> "The right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial, rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance, the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of force."

A study of our Constitution and of the cases in the Supreme Court interpreting it, teaches us a number of important lessons.

First, it is vital to bear in mind that the struggle for civil rights and for popular liberty is never over. Even where the Constitution clearly forbids certain conduct and even where the Supreme Court has said it forbids certain conduct, the people must be vigilant to make sure that their rights are kept alive. A right is something like a muscle in the human body.

If you don't use it, if you don't exercise it, it becomes weak and powerless.

Second, you must always remember that the liberty and freedom of the people can be preserved only so long as the Supreme Court devotes itself to the task of preserving civil rights.

For many, many years in this country the Supreme Court served as the spokesman for the rights of property. Human rights meant very little to the Court then, while property rights were considered paramount. Gradually the Supreme Court changed its outlook; it has come to recognize that human rights are more important than property rights.

This change was largely due to the excellent judges appointed by the Supreme Court by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The future of liberty in this country depends greatly upon future appointments of equally high caliber to our highest tribunal.

If corporation lawyers are appointed justices of the Supreme Court, there is great danger that the view that property rights are more important than human rights will once more arise.

Only if progressive-minded judges are appointed to the Court can we safeguard the gains we have already won in the field of civil rights.

Finally, we must never lose sight of the importance of organization as a means of defending and advancing civil rights. If an individual is deprived of his rights, he is usually helpless to do very much about it by himself. Only through the power and the strength of his labor organization can he obtain from the courts a real measure of protection of his constitutional rights.

The history of the past few years, in and out of the courts, has clearly demonstrated that labor organizations constitute the most vital single force in American life for the protection of the rights of the people.



LOCATION OF FEDERAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

District	Name	Headquarters
Alabama, northern	John D. Hill	356 Federal Building Birmingham
Alabama, middle	E. Burns Parker	Court House and Custom House, Montgomery
Alabama, southern	Albert J. Tully	St. Joseph & St. Louis Sts., Mobile
Alaska, Div. #1	Patrick J. Gilmore, Jr.	Juneau
Alaska, Div. #2	Frank C. Bingham	Nome
Alaska, Div. #3	Raymond E. Plummer	3rd and F Street Anchorage
Alaska, Div. #4	Harry O. Arend	Fairbanks
Arizona	Frank E. Flynn	1st Ave., & Van Buren St., Phoenix
Arkansas, eastern	James T. Gooch	Capital Ave. & Arch St. Little Rock
Arkansas, western	Respess S. Wilson	So. 6th St. & Parker Ave. Fort Smith
California, northern	Frank J. Hennessy	Fulton & Leavenworth St. San Francisco
California, southern	James M. Carter	312 N. Spring St. Los Angeles
Canal Zone	Daniel E. McGrath	3rd Court Building Ancon, Canal Zone
Colorado	Thos. J. Morrissey	Denver
Connecticut	Adrian W. Maher	New Haven
Delaware	John J. Morris, Jr.	11th & King Sts. Wilmington
District of Columbia	Edward M. Curran	D between 4th & 5th St., N.W. Washington, D. C. (U. S. Court House)
Florida, northern	George Earl Hoffman	Palafox & Chase Sts. Pensacola
Florida, southern	Herbert S. Phillips	Tampa
Georgia, northern	M. Neil Andrews	Forsyth & Poplar Sts. Atlanta
Georgia, middle	John P. Cowart	Macon
Georgia, southern	J. Saxton Daniel	Savannah

Hawaii	Ray J. O'Brien	King & Richard Sts. Honolulu
Idaho	John A. Carver	Boise
Illinois, northern	J. Albert Woll	219 S. Clark St. Chicago
Illinois, eastern	William W. Hart	East St. Louis & Benton
Illinois, southern	Howard L. Doyle	600 E. Monroe Springfield
Indiana, northern	Alexander M. Campbell	Fort Wayne
Indiana, southern	B. Howard Caughran	221 Ohio & Pa. Sts. Indianapolis
Iowa, northern	Tobias E. Diamond	321 Sixth & Pearl Sts. Sioux City
Iowa, southern	Maurice F. Donegan	E. 1 & Walnut Sts. Des Moines
Kansas	Randolph Carpenter	Topeka & Kansas City
Kentucky, eastern	Claude P. Stephens	Armstrong Ave. & 7th St. Lexington
Kentucky, western	David C. Walls	Broadway & 6th Sts. Louisville
Louisiana, eastern	Herbert W. Christenberry	New Orleans
Louisiana, western	Malcolm E. Lafargue	424 Texas St. Shreveport
Maine	John D. Clifford, Jr.	156 Federal & Pearl Sts. Portland
Maryland	Bernard J. Flynn	Baltimore
Massachusetts	Edmund J. Brandon	Devonshire & Water Sts. Boston
Michigan, eastern	John C. Lehr	813 Wayne & Fort Sts. Detroit
Michigan, western	Joseph F. Deeb	N. Ionia & Pearl Sts. Grand Rapids
Minnesota	Victor E. Anderson	Old Post Office Building 228 Market & 6th Sts. St. Paul
Mississippi, northern	Chester L. Sumners	Oxford
Mississippi, southern	Toxey Hall	South West & Capitol Sts. Jackson
Missouri, eastern	Harry C. Blanton	U. S. Court House & Custom House, 1114 Market St. St. Louis
Missouri, western	Sam M. Wear	Grand Ave. & 9th St. Kansas City

Montana	John B. Tansil	1st Ave. & 26th St., N. Billings
Nebraska	Joseph T. Votava	629 First Nat. Bank Building Omaha
Nevada	Miles N. Pike	Reno
New Hampshire	Dennis E. Sullivan	Capitol & N. State Sts. Concord
New Jersey	Edgar H. Rossbach	Newark
New Mexico	Everett M. Grantham	Sante Fe
New York, northern	Irving J. Higbee	Clinton Square Syracuse
New York, southern	John F. X. McGohey	U. S. Court House, Foley Square, New York City
New York, eastern	J. Vincent Keogh	Washington & Johnson Sts. Brooklyn
New York, western	George L. Grobe	Buffalo
North Carolina, eastern	John H. Manning	Third Floor, P.O. Building Raleigh
North Carolina, middle	Bryce R. Holt, Act. Head Carlisle W. Higgins	Greensboro
North Carolina, western	David E. Henderson	Charlotte
North Dakota	Powless W. Lanier	324 Federal Building Fargo
Ohio, northern	Donald C. Miller	Superior & Wood Sts. Cleveland
Ohio, southern	Ray J. O'Donnell	Columbus
Oklahoma, northern	Whitfield Y. Mauzy	Boulder Ave. & 2nd St. Tulsa
Oklahoma, eastern	Cleon A. Summers	5th St. & West Broadway Muskogee
Oklahoma, western	Charles E. Dierker	Oklahoma City
Oregon	Henry L. Hess	Main & Broadway Portland
Pennsylvania, eastern	Gerald A. Gleeson	U. S. Court House 9th & Chestnut Sts. Philadelphia
Pennsylvania, middle	Arthur A. Maguire	Scranton
Pennsylvania, western	Charles F. Uhl	Grand St. & 7th Ave. Pittsburgh
Puerto Rico	Philip F. Herrick	Comercio & Tanca Sts. San Juan
Rhode Island	George F. Troy	Providence

South Carolina, eastern	Claud N. Sapp	Columbia
South Carolina, western	Oscar Henry Doyle	East Washington & South Irvine St., Greenville
South Dakota	George Philip	Rapid City
Tennessee, eastern	James B. Frazier, Jr.	Georgia Ave. & E. 10th St. Chattanooga
Tennessee, middle	Horace Frierson	Broad St. & 8th Ave., S. Nashville
Tennessee, western	William McClanahan	Memphis
Texas, northern	R. B. Young, Jr.	W. 10th St. & Burnett St. Fort Worth
Texas, southern	Brian S. Odem	205 P.O. Building Houston
Texas, eastern	Steve M. King	Beaumont
Texas, western	James McC. Burnett	Alamo & E. Houston Sts. San Antonio
Utah	Dan B. Shields	Salt Lake City
Vermont	Jos. A. McNamara	Burlington
Virgin Islands	James A. Bough	St. Thomas
Virginia, eastern	Harry H. Holt, Jr.	Norfolk
Virginia, western	Howard C. Gilmer, Jr., Acting Head Frank S. Tavenner	Church Ave. & 3rd St. Roanoke
Washington, eastern	Harvey Erickson	Lincoln St. & Main Ave. Spokane
Washington, western	J. Charles Dennis	U. S. Court House 5th Ave. & Madison St. Seattle
West Virginia, northern	Joe V. Gibson	Clarksburg
West Virginia, southern	Leslie E. Given	Charleston
Wisconsin, eastern	Timothy T. Cronin	517 E. Wisconsin Ave. Milwaukee
Wisconsin, western	Charles H. Cashin	215 Monane Ave. Madison
Wyoming	Carl L. Sackett	Cheyenne